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DEDICATION

This book is dedicated to two cyberspace heroes: TIM BERNERS-LEE, who created the World Wide Web and the Internet domain system, which should have made him richer than Bill Gates, but who settled instead to content himself as a lowly academic basking in the knowledge that he changed the world by insisting that the Web remain free for all users; and MARC ANDREASON, who created Mosiac, the first effective and user-friendly Internet browser. Without them there would be no on-ramps to the Internet Superhighway and a lot more toll booths. Obviously this book would never have happened without them.
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FOREWORD

Everette E. Dennis

Nothing inspires critical analysis of media — whether traditional or alternative — than war. The 2003 Iraq War, which continued as an insurgency three years later, is no exception. Like other wars that came before, it is the “Big Story” — one that commands attention in the nations involved and elsewhere. And always for the communicator and the audience, there is concern about the pursuit of truth, which ancient commentator Aeschylus called “the first casualty” of any war. Communicating the essence of war also employs the technology of the day, whether that is the telegraph and the photograph in the Crimean War, radio in both World Wars, television in Vietnam and digital media in the two Gulf Wars.

There is much controversy about the origins and rationale for the war in Iraq, officially called Operation Iraqi Freedom by the coalition forces, made up mainly of U.S. and British troops. There is, however, less mystery about the role of media in covering this war from the embedded reporters (mostly representing major news organizations) to various alternative and insurgent voices that have less official access. Both use modern digital technologies to tell their stories. Lessons from the Persian Gulf War of 1991 are abundant. That was the first “real time” war, which included what several colleagues and I in a study called “the Charge of the E-Mail Brigade,” because various new technologies were employed to cover the news and engage opinion and advocacy. That was before the Internet and World Wide Web were fully accessible to most citizens even in information societies, let alone the developing world.

One lesson from the first Gulf War, evident then and now, is the reality that government control and the inevitable desire to censor has suffered a lethal blow. New technologies simply won’t allow it since Internet users can make end-runs around old barriers that ranged from military-sanctioned messages from the war zone to the jamming of radio signals. The first Gulf War benefited from early e-mail messaging, digital transmission of still photographs, fax machines, satellite phones, laptop
computers and satellite uplinks. How quaint those tools seem today in a more seamless digital world with easy access to the Internet and the dynamism of interactivity at the core. In this new world of converging media, full-motion video is easily transmitted while high-speed Internet and broadband service offer instantaneous connections.

Once “war correspondence,” another seemingly antiquarian term these days, was limited to accredited correspondents, like those embedded with U.S. and British forces in Iraq, but the convergence of all media in global networks opens the possibility that formerly “enemy” communicators get access to information and can transmit it almost anywhere they wish, something unprecedented in the history of wartime coverage and communication. No longer can censors block “correspondence,” including that delivered by active bloggers. Suddenly borders are porous and addressable messages can reach almost anyone, anywhere.

The conditions suggested in communicating on and about the Iraq War bring together three of my favorite topics: global and international communication in the context of war; alternative media; and media technologies. I have explored these topics in various studies and research projects over the years, beginning with work on the New Journalism and alternative media during the Vietnam era. This was a time when war critics mostly had to operate on fugitive platforms (alternative, underground, and military underground newspapers) within the United States, where they were pariahs to establishment media, let alone government sources. Even before that I was interested in the role of technological change in media, working on convergence issues nearly two decades before the Internet would triumph and take terms like cybernetics and cyberspace from technical reports to popular parlance. And finally, war coverage from the long forgotten “digestible bite” in Granada, through the Persian Gulf and beyond, provides compelling terrain for understanding media government relations.

That and more is what media scholar Ralph D. Berenger and his colleagues have done in *Cybermedia Go to War: Converging Media During and After the 2003 Iraq War*, which is a vital companion to Dr. Berenger’s earlier volume, *Global Media Go to War: Role of News and Entertainment During the 2003 Iraq War*. In *Cybermedia Go to War*, Dr. Berenger and some 33 media scholars, many of them young and promising new contributors to our literature, explore the nature and impact of Web-based digital communication on media content and its distribution while also probing deeper to see what impact these new transitional forms have on news and entertainment itself. This means considering media functions — information, entertainment and opinion — and how they fare
in the world of cyberspace. Whether the interactive environments blur and merge in new configurations or are actually transformative in some other fashion is a matter of debate.

Behind several of the essays and studies presented here is a nagging question about whether cybermedia are independent (or alternative) media that are part of a larger professional media system or more akin to pamphleteering and propaganda, a subset of marketing and promotion. As the authors posit, they are both, which means that sorting out and distinguishing information is more difficult than it was when media were more singular and perhaps more predictable.

What editor Berenger and his colleagues offer here causes us to think more deeply about the impact and influence of cybermedia — what they are, their known extensions and connecting links as well as the role they play in informing ordinary citizens and policymakers alike. The authors explore important questions about the extent to which cybermedia are genuine agents of change as well as agents of control — or both. Of course, this is virgin territory and few, if any, other studies offer this kind of thoughtful, speculative analysis.

Based at the American University in Cairo, Dr. Berenger has enlisted a cadre of cooperating researchers, many of them also located in the Middle East, who offer a perspective not often found among media scholars whose international and regional experience is more limited. That’s one of the great benefits of these studies that cohere nicely with unifying themes and critical integration. The result might have been confusion and complexity, given the range of material and admittedly ephemeral examples, but instead what we have are media studies in real time, a visual portrait of contemporary communication at the dawn of a new era.

Cybermedia are much more mature today than they were when early e-mail brigades set their course in the 1991 Gulf War, but this work offers a foundation for understanding cyber communication while charting its changes — and ultimately its consequences — for us all. Happily, Dr. Berenger and his coauthors have produced a well-written and accessible volume whose value will be self-evident to any reader.
Much of what the world learned about the 2003 war in Iraq was learned from nontraditional news sources, often before the mainstream media reported the stories. The Internet, while in a neophytic stage of development during the 1991 Iraq War, was widely available to the average computer user a dozen years later and played a large role in how people gained, internalized and, in some cases, shared that information with others. E-mails have replaced handwritten notes and letters as the interpersonal communication of choice. Digital photographs and messages can be sent around the world with the speed of a single key stroke. Online diaries and logs — called Weblogs — allow professional journalists and amateur writers alike to communicate with huge mass audiences, sometimes numbered in the millions, with links to other blogs and computer sites. It was, as suggested by Rodney Weideman of IT Net and others, America's first global Internet war.

The computer and Internet made communications instantaneous while obliterating the concept of a news cycle. That infinite realm known as cyberspace also contained its share of rascals and scoundrels. Internet users had to develop a skeptical as well as a discerning eye about information coming out of or about the 2003 Iraq War. Even visuals, digital still photographs and video, could be altered and manipulated with the help of photo- and video-editing programs. Hoaxes abounded. Fact-checking sites like www.snopes.com were busy tracking down e-mail hoaxes and misinformation passed from one inbox to another.

Supporting the notion that nothing is private in cyberspace, photographs intended for archival or personal use were intercepted from online photo albums, which happened to a Seattle-based contractor whose j-pops of flag-draped coffins in a cargo-hold provoked immediate outrage by U.S. government officials, and her removal from Iraq. Digital photos posted online by guards at Abu Ghraib prison and downloaded by newspapers and Web sites around the world sparked an immediate outcry by already-angry Arabs around the globe. Those pictures fueled a media
frenzy in the United States. A Google search in 2005 found that the prison abuse was mentioned at 5.4 million of the 188 million sites that discussed the war. E-mail messages from military-sponsored cybercafes and soldier Weblogs also provided grist for the mainstream media.

Meanwhile, a cyberwar of sorts broke out on the Internet, with the English Al-Jazeera Web site being hacked shortly after its launch in March 2003 with a picture of an American flag superimposed over a map of the United States. As Naima Hamdy and Radwa Mobarak pointed out in *Global Media Go to War*, thousands of chat rooms with millions of hits a day debated the merits of the war and its outcome. Converging to the newest medium, traditional news sites reported an increase of between 30% and 150% during the last two weeks of March 2003, when shooting broke out. The BBC Web site recorded 150 million visits alone. CNN Online posted similar numbers. Responding to the demand of up-to-the-minute news of the war, BBC broadcast around the clock on its Web site to a global audience.

Even after George Bush’s presidential “mission accomplished” pronouncement May 1, 2003, the rationale for going to war in the first place continued to be debated in chatrooms, listservs and e-mail exchanges. Did Saddam Hussein really threaten regional peace? Did Iraq possess weapons of mass destruction (WMD) or did American and British governments lie to their peoples to get their support for the war? Can democracy be imposed? Did Iraq provide aid and comfort to terrorist organizations? Are the Iraqi people worse off under the American occupation than they were under Saddam? Is any country in the Middle East capable of civil, democratic societies given their histories and cultures? Was the war all about America’s thirst for cheap oil? Or was it about the political ambitions of George W. Bush to win a second term, and his desire to finish the job his father started in 1991 by removing Saddam Hussein from power? Or were there grander issues? Was Iraq invaded because Israel felt threatened by the growing economic and military capabilities of neighboring Arab states, sworn enemies of the Jewish state? Were Afghanistan and then Iraq the first two dominos to fall in the Near East? Who was next: Syria or Iran? Since the two invaded countries were Muslim, was this an abject example of Samuel Huntington’s clash of civilizations and a gloomy portend of things to come?

The Internet is no respecter of national borders, of time, or, for that matter, of unquestioned patriotism or nationalism. Charges can be quickly matched by counter charges, simple assertions can be stripped away by clicking on the next link. Cyberspace is both a vast reservoir of useful
information and a babbling brook of streaming consciousness. All is there for the world to see and ponder; to ignore and absorb; to mobilize or remain silent. In short, the new media offered users an unparalleled array of choices to become either passive or active consumers of information—and for traditional news consumers this blizzard of conflicting digital images, facts, sources, and access to information from all sides of the conflict was as unsettling as it was satisfying. The cyberspace war’s information blitzkrieg might have caused at least one casualty: understanding. In this case, Neil Postman might have gotten it right when he warned that too much information could be as debilitating on an individual’s comprehension of events and knowledge-building as not enough information.

Of course, consumers of information are selective in what they seek out. Psychologically, individuals are more apt to choose information that strengthen and support their preconceptions, biases, ideologies and core beliefs. Rarely does selected information alter individual schema. Information that challenges a person’s belief system can result in what Leon Festinger called “cognitive dissonance.” Very few humans are like F. Scott Fitzgerald’s Daisy in The Great Gatsby. Individuals are simply incapable of holding contradictory viewpoints of equal weight and importance, and they will reject, rationalize and repress cognitive stimuli that cause psychological discomfort. Selective perception and cognitive dissonance are two possible explicates of what happened to audiences in the 2003 Iraq War.

Those who strongly favored the war, either out of revenge for 9/11 or fear that Iraq posed a threat to world peace, were supportive to the end, although they tended to rationalize the reasons of going to war in the first place. War opponents sought out information that supported their opposition, especially in the Arab World, where a generation of media consumers has been “cultivated” by its media systems, controlled by authoritarian regimes, to accept certain precepts as “true” and contrary viewpoints as “false” because they came from lands that allegedly are ignorant of Middle East cultures and have media systems that allegedly portray Arabs and the dominant religion, Islam, unfavorably (as was the case of the 2005 Danish political cartoon controversy that was believed to depict the Prophet Muhammed, a cultural taboo). The digitalized cartoons, by the way, were widely distributed by Islamic activists over the Internet, thus expanding globally the reach of these drawings and eliciting violent protests in places that are densely populated by Muslims around the world. So access to vast repositories of information over the Internet does not necessarily change hearts and minds because, again, individuals
“choose” message frames that reinforce what they already believe.

Scholarship has affirmed the concept that opinion formation is enhanced if the receiver of a message knows, trusts and identifies with the sender. The stronger the affinity and identification, the stronger impact messages have on recipients’ opinion formation. Given that e-mail messages and forwarded Web links are often sent to individuals in a sender’s address book, the impact of those messages on opinion formation cannot be disregarded. Again, individual schema are generally reinforced because the receiver knows, trusts and identifies with the sender of the message. As is often the case, the receiver of a message forwards it to friends and relatives in his or her address book with a predictable impact on the second set of receivers thus contributing to a multiple flow of the message content. The challenge for subsequent media scholars will be to continue their research into this dynamic of media effects, deriving significance and understanding from those studies.

CHARACTERISTICS OF “NEW MEDIA”

The characteristics of the “new media” — usually defined as anything digital that communicates to known and unknown audiences in actual (synchronous) or delayed (asynchronous) time — fall into several broad categories.

Convergent. Nearly all new media use or have the capabilities of using a variety of different media that converge or synthesize into a new type of communication media. Of course, it can be argued that there is no such thing as “new media.” When telegraph messages sped the process of communicating from far-away places in the 19th century, it could have been regarded as a new media. The same could be said of commercial radio when it emerged early in the 20th century, and television as it became the dominant medium in the last half of that century. The adaptation of the Internet for information, combining words, pictures, sound and video, and allowing for interactivity, is only the latest to fall under the rubric of a new media, while predecessors join the category of traditional or legacy media. Logically, there is no such thing as a new media, some skeptical scholars assert, only “preconvergent media.” During the 2003 Iraq War and its aftermath, Web sites carried text messages, audiovisual material, some of it created specifically for those Web sites, and links to similar sites with multimedia formats. A recent development has
been downloadable multimedia material to iPods and hand-held telecommunications devices such as inexpensive mobile phones.

**Ubiquitous.** Preconvergent media are everywhere in cyberspace and accessed by mobile telephony as well as computer users. Clearly, the exponential growth of cyberspace and its asynchronous/synchronous nature makes information and analysis available to more people than ever before. Individuals can connect to the wide information reservoir at home, in the office, at their university, or at the proliferating cyber cafés that pop up even in remote locations. Wireless technologies, available during the 2003 Iraq War, allowed millions of users to access information on the Internet from a park bench or a parked car, or simply while walking down the sidewalk. Advances in computer science have led to more user-friendly programs that anyone, young or old, can use. Governments and non-governmental organizations, concerned about the digital divide, are globally stepping up efforts to make computers and Internet connections accessible not only to the elites in those countries, which is the case now, but the average person as well. In some regions, like the Middle East, which lags everywhere else in the world except Sub-Sahara Africa, growth will have to be exponential to catch up. But Internet access during 2003-2005 doubled in the Middle East.

**Agenda-setting.** Many stories covered in cyberspace set the agenda for mainstream media, and monitoring Web sites and blogs is an essential weapon in the arsenal of all reporters. Search engines such as Google, Ask, Netscape and Yahoo! are used in newsrooms to fact-check stories and collect story background. Stories carried on Weblogs and Web sites often set the tone for “water cooler” discussions as well as listservs that target specific interest groups, as well as mainstream media reporters. This agenda-setting function of the new media was evident during the 2003 Iraq War, as Internet discussants often quoted Weblogs with the same authority as they would cite newspaper and television reportage or academic studies. Bloggers such as Salam Pax were often quoted in newspaper and magazine reports, giving them the same attention as governmental sources of the war. Such a rich diversity calls into question the “social control” function of media and their ability to set national and international agendas.

**Credibility.** The adage of “seeing is believing” is a chief characteristic of the preconvergent media. Puzzling to some scholars is how
Weblogs have acquired instant credibility with a vast number of users because they often mix analysis with interpretation of news stories, and the bloggers’ credentials — which are highly valued in academia as evidence of credibility — are often lacking. They are credible because they are there, in cyberspace for the world to see; without mediation from journalism professionals, and without pressures from advertisers and clients, elites, routine newsroom practices and customs. Unlike Gertrude Stein’s derision of Oakland as “there’s no there there,” virtual space does not need place, time or even some acknowledged controlling authority like a government to have a presence. Anyone with a computer, modem and a perspective can find a home in virtual space and attain instant credibility. The legacy media also have a presence on the Internet. Hardly a newspaper or magazine is absent from the Internet, and those blogger sites that link or quote these sites add to bloggers’ credibility.

*Interactivity.* The new media are interactive, and perhaps this characteristic is what sets them apart from their predecessors. This interactive characteristic allows anyone to express his or her views, often without mediation or editing, on topics raised by Internet sites or Weblogs.

*Transferability.* The cut and paste function of the digital realm allows large blocks of information to be transmitted as well as linked. Material contained on Web sites can be cut and pasted into e-mails and sent to other users who might have missed the initial posting. Since individuals seem to be greatly influenced by opinion leaders they perceive to share their worldviews, interests and similar societal, political or sociological orientations, these transferred messages are generally given a high degree of credence by recipients. The multi-step flow of information’s impact on opinion formation has never been as evident as it is in the digital age.

**Purpose of This Book**

In *Global Media Go to War* (Marquette Books, 2004), scholars and working journalists contributed 34 essays and studies about media behavior during the 2003 Iraq War in the first compendium of its type to be published. Although several chapters centered on uses of alternative media in a specific section called “The War in Cyberspace,” the intent of
that book was to paint in broad strokes about the role and behaviors of mostly traditional news and entertainment media in helping global audiences come to grips with the run-up, prosecution and aftermath of the war.

It was clear toward the end of that project, however, that a companion volume was needed to complete the picture of war coverage, but this time from a nontraditional media’s focal point. Hence was planted the seed for *Cybermedia Go to War: Role of Converging Media During and After the 2003 Iraq War*. Readers seeking a fuller picture of how the media behaved during the war will find themselves referring, as I did, to *Global Media Go to War* to provide cross-media context and historical timelines to better understand many of the studies presented in this volume even though this work stands on its own as well.

This book attempts to answer questions raised by preconvergent or new media’s behavior. What impact, if any, did cyberspace have on the creation and distribution of news during wartime? Did it rob traditional media of their iron-vise grip on news and information? Could the Internet hold government — and the mainstream media — more accountable for getting the facts and interpretation of those facts? Could it help mobilize opposition to or support for a war? Was it an agent of control or change or both?

The answers to these questions were inconclusive, fragmentary and situational, this book expectedly found. Yet, it moves the ball closer to the goal of full and complete understanding of the role of the new media in war coverage in the digital era.

Following the benchmarks set by *Global Media Go to War*, the authors were asked to write chapters that resulted in a book that was cross-disciplinary in nature; cross-cultural; cross-generational and which focused on the behavior of the digital media. Senior and junior scholars present perspectives from both sides of the conflict from a variety of cultural orientations and nationalities. Surprising cogency emerged from this eclectic mix, which should add to the book’s readability. Speaking of which, readability was high on the list of desirables contained in the call for chapters. Like *Global Media Go to War*, I wanted a book that could be read and understood by undergraduates, professional journalists and the general reading public, devoid of much of the academic language that often sacrifices clarity for exactness that unfortunately results in obfuscation. Credit deservedly belongs to the authors, most inculcated with academese in their everyday lives, who admirably accomplished this goal.
**How This Book is Organized**

This book of 23 chapters is divided into five parts containing studies and essays by 33 authors or coauthors for readers who have a special interest in various aspects of the converging new media, or for researchers seeking studies on alternative media uses during times of conflict.

The book was designed with classroom use in mind. At the end of each chapter are five discussion questions that can be used by instructors to stimulate students to develop a deeper understanding of the issues and theories raised by the authors. Like its predecessor, this book would be suited for courses in international conflict studies, international communication studies, undergraduate and graduate seminars on uses of new and alternative media, and courses in public diplomacy, itself a converged discipline emerging from international relations and diplomacy, and mass communication. The nonacademic reader, however, should find the discussion questions provocative and illuminating as well as they try to assimilate the ideas contained in the chapters.

Writing the foreword to this book is media scholar Ev Dennis, creating a reunion of sorts between professor and student. Dr. Dennis was my thesis advisor at the University of Minnesota some 30 years ago. He has had a profound influence on media studies worldwide and an even greater impact on my thinking about how media facilitate or hinder audience’s understanding of information they disseminate.

**Part I — The 2003 Iraq War in an Era of Convergent Media**

The first seven chapters address the issue of how converging media behaved during the war. Stephen Quinn brings the reader immediately into the realm of media technologies and war, recounting how communication technologies have always helped war correspondents do their job, from the Crimea War of the mid-19th century to the first war of the 21st century. The multimedia reporter, he says, arrived in full flower in the 2003 Iraq War. The availability of inexpensive hardware, he hints, raises an intriguing possibility that amateur journalists might one day rival their paid brethren in collecting news and disseminating news.

While most of the book deals with the digital media, the second chapter by Atushi Tajima, et al., puts the pre-Iraq War into perspective by studying the front pages of 523 newspapers around the world, all of them with their own Web sites that now reach global audiences. A recent study, reported in *Editor & Publisher Online*, says that because of online
newspapers and gateway sites, like drudgereport.com and others on the Internet, more people around the world than ever are reading stories generated by newspapers, even as print edition circulations are shrinking. How these newspapers “framed” the Iraq War debate was the focus of this chapter.

Shafiqur Rahman and Jyotika Ramasprasad build on Tajima, et al., by comparing the venerable New York Times coverage of the war with its online edition and Yahoo! News to see if there were differences in coverage between a local newspaper designed for local and national readers, and the Internet versions designed for a global audience.

Daniela V. Dimitrova concentrates on the BBC News’ online coverage of the war and how the news organization found itself making news during the Dr. David Kelley incident, all dutifully reported on its Web site. The BBC obviously recognized its importance to satisfy global audience needs of news, often at the expense of Britain’s international political interests.

Chapters 5-7 focus on the Middle East, and how the region coped with the war over the Internet despite the fact that fewer than 10 million residents of that region had access to the Web during the war. That figure that has been climbing steadily, however, as regional governments are making access to the Information Superhighway one of their national development goals.

Tal Azran reports in Chapter 5 his study of english.aljazeera.net and how the West perceived this instrument of information counter flow that reported news of the war through an Arab filter.

In Chapter 6, three Middle Eastern junior scholars — Injy Galal, Amy Ahmed and Lama al-Hammouri provide an Arab perspective of CNN and Al-Jazeera’s coverage of the war to determine how either media outlet framed the conflict for their respective audiences.

Following up on Al-Jazeera’s impact on Arab audiences, senior scholar Muhammad Ayish takes a closer look at the aljazeera.net Web site and probes how the site shaded the news for an Arab audience, sometimes at the loss of what Westerners would consider objective news coverage.

Part II — The Convergent Media’s Power to Mobilize

Chapters in this part deal specifically with the ability of the converging media to mobilize large numbers of like-minded individuals around a specific issue. The huge, international antiwar rally Feb. 15, 2003, was an abject example. Never before had so many people — variously estimated
up to 50 million people worldwide — been moved to congregate in world capitals to protest an impending war.

The first two chapters in this part deal with Independent Media Centers. Carlos Fontes, in Chapter 8, draws broad strokes around the use of alternative media from his vantage point inside the WestMass IMC, while Lisa Brooten looks at the inner workings of the St. Louis IMC in Chapter 9. Both chapters allude to the mobilization ability of computer-based activist organizations.

In Chapter 10, Jon Pike studies how small social movements, like moveon.org, can become important, sustained political forces with the potential of influencing national affairs and possibly international policy, while in Chapter 11, Shaun Peter Cannon reports on his study of how a couple of volunteer workers with a computer and modem, who called themselves the Victoria Peace Network, mobilized tens of thousands of antiwar protesters by e-mail. Mobilization over the converging media also took place in the Middle East, as Ibrahim Al-Marashi in Chapter 12 found. He writes about the cyber-insurgency and Iraqi resistance movements.

Part III — How People Used New Media During the War

While Part II centers on the mobilization aspect of the alternative media, this part focuses on the various uses of media by individuals and groups during the war. The first chapter explores how e-mails, developed less than a decade earlier as a communication device with worldwide reach, were used during the 2003 war. In Chapter 13, Emmanuel Alozie investigates e-mail as an instrument of war propaganda and finds that the U.S. government’s destabilization strategy had only marginal success.

In Chapter 14, Egyptians Dina Hussein and Naglaa Hassanien report on a uses and gratifications study of Internet use by elite Arabs during the war, while in Chapter 15 Lamya Tawfik looks at young Arabs’ home pages to see if they created an identifiable Arab identity and found that the Iraq War was not the main thing that interested them. Across the oceans, Elaine Cardenas found essentially the same thing in Chapter 16 among predominantly American users of online diaries.

Part IV — Blogging During War: A New Journalistic Form or Trivial Self Expression?

Weblogs entered public consciousness — and lexicon — during the 2003 Iraq War and in many cases rivaled traditional news reports in
credibility and readability for Internet users.

Blogging, technically available since the 1990s, increased in popularity after 9/11 and reached public acceptance during and after the 2003 Iraq War. Of the 865 blogs in 2005 concerned with the Iraq War, 600 of them were started during the war and insurgency in 2003 and 2004, according to the Blogosphere Ecosystem at truthlaidbear.com. Millions of people followed the writings of a Baghdad blogger, Salam Pax, during the war as well as dozens of amateur and professional journalists, who shared their impressions of the conflict, their media organization’s response to it, and their political perspectives by writing Weblogs, some of them interactive and most of them linked to traditional media Web sites for background information. At first, mainstream media eschewed this rival, forbidding their reporters to post blogs online, but as Weblogs grew in popularity, some traditional media encouraged their reporters to post links to their individual blogs on the news organization’s Web sites.

In Chapter 17, Melissa A. Wall ponders the question of whether blogs are a new genre of war reporting, and if so what changes in media strategies would result. In the next chapter, Kaye D. Trammell examines celebrity Weblogs and how well known personalities treated this conflict. In Chapter 19, scholars Thomas J. Johnson and Barbara K. Kaye ask the salient question of whether blogs are siphoning off audiences from traditional media sources.

Part V — Effects of Convergent Media

This final segment looks at the effect on users of the alternative media and attempts to connect the dots of the previous chapters by examining how digital media might impact individuals and society.

David D. Perlmutter (Chapter 20) ponders “The Big Picture” in his examination of the Fallujah incident and documents how the photojournalistic event faded from youthful consciousness over time. Similarly, Carol B. Schwalbe investigates mainstream U.S. news Web sites in Chapter 21 to show how the faces of war we do not see can be as important as those we do see.

Andrew Paul Williams in Chapter 22 reinforces Marshall McLuhan’s dictum that the media are the message, not merely the messengers, in what he calls “Net narcissism.” Finally, in Chapter 23, David Weinstock and Tim Boudreau continue their study from the previous volume of the effect of online Iraq War news on young audiences, and find leading TV Web sites had as much appeal for young audiences as spinach and liver.
A Final Thought

This introduction asserted earlier that all new media are more accurately described as preconvergent media, which begs the question: preconvergent with what?

The correct answer is: who knows? Did anyone predict at the birth of the telephone in the 19th century that one day call-in radio stations would widely use it — often distributing their programs globally via satellite and the Internet? Or when radio was in its infancy, did anyone imagine how television would one day bring war into the living room? Or when television was first broadcast in England in the late 1930s, did anyone suspect that viewers in 1996 would hear and see choral groups on five continents singing in unison in real time Beethoven’s Ode to Joy at the Sydney Olympics, or would be witnessing in 1991 the eerie night-vision live broadcasts via satellite of the bombing of Baghdad? And at the height of the Golden Age of TV in the 1960s did anyone imagine that those programs would have global appeal decades after they were originally broadcast? Or when home computers became available in the 1980s, who could have predicted the impact of the Internet on shaping opinions and attitudes of a global audience? Yet all of these media have converged into common usage today. So it is logical to assume that the Internet one day will also converge into something new and different. After all, we’ve only had a few decades of experimentation with this “new media.”

If we have learned anything from two centuries of technological development in mass communication it is this: No one can foresee either the effects of new media on mass audiences or what the final — if that is a correct word to use — form media and the content they carry will take. At best we can only study what is in front of us, and speculate on what will be.

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Part I

The 2003 Iraq War in an Era of Convergent Media
War may be horrid and brutish, but journalism usually benefits from coverage of conflict. Technologies developed for war coverage tend to improve newsgathering processes in general, accelerating the speed at which news is delivered and boosting the quality of coverage. Baron Paul Julius von Reuter gave the news agency that bears his name a head start on its rivals when, from about the middle of the 19th century, he introduced pigeons to speed correspondents' reports from the fronts of various wars. Journalists were still using pigeons to avoid traffic as recently as the Tokyo Olympics in 1964.

Photographs helped document the American Civil War (its introduction was during the Crimean War six years earlier, along with the concept of the foreign correspondent), along with the telegraph, which linked battlefields with major newsrooms in the United States. Fear of disrupted telegraph lines during the American Civil War taught journalists to send the essence of the story early, leading to the development of the inverted-pyramid structure and summary lead. Interestingly, this was probably the first war in which Americans saw live fighting. Audiences at the first battle of Bull Run on July 21, 1861, watched the conflict from the comfort of their picnic blankets until the horror of what they were witnessing set in and they fled back to Washington. It took another 142 years before American audiences were able to watch live fighting, this time in the comfort of their homes and offices via satellite from Iraq.

During the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, small digital video cameras, satellite phones and laptop computers proved a boon for broadcast and print journalists alike. These technologies allowed them to feed stories and images quickly back to their newsrooms, and freed news teams from being tethered to a large satellite uplink. Those computers and satellite phones were the descendants of technology developed during World War II and the Cold War, respectively.
Computers were developed to accelerate the calculations needed to provide accurate ballistics charts for artillery. And U.S. military spending on space boomed after the Soviet Union put the first Sputnik satellite into orbit in 1956. A major newsgathering innovation, the videophone, came of age during the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, especially in areas where electricity was scarce, weather conditions appalling, and transport and telephone connections unreliable. BBC correspondent Ben Brown told of how he rode a horse for two hours to reach the front in Afghanistan because the roads were so poor. Dick Tauber, CNN’s vice president for satellites and circuits, said sand was the worst enemy his staff encountered in Iraq. “The sand is so fine, it’s insidious,” he said at the time.

News organizations have employed what they learned during war to improve newsgathering during peace. During the 2004 U.S. presidential primaries, cable news network MSNBC embedded a young reporter with each of the Democrat candidates. MSNBC gave each reporter technology tested on the Iraqi battlefields: A small video camera, a tripod, and a powerful laptop for editing footage. The reporters were one-person operations, sending their reports to MSNBC over any available high-speed Internet connection. Often this was from the nearest Starbucks coffee shop. Reporters set up their cameras before interviewing and filming the candidate. Each edited his or her footage on a laptop, wrote articles for the Web, and reported live. Mark Lukasiewicz, executive producer of NBC’s “Campaign Embed,” said viewers responded to the concept based on their knowledge of embedded reporters in Iraq. “The part of it we’re applying to the campaigns is having reporters with the campaigns, with their stories, all the time, living and breathing it.” Wall Street Journal reporter Michael Phillips said the network “saved a bundle,” because the one-person reporting teams did not need camera or sound crews or expensive satellite hook-ups. The candidates got “straight coverage with minimal spin” and many junior reporters had the chance to prove themselves (Phillips, 2003).

This chapter argues that the vast improvements in newsgathering technologies at the start of the 21st century are finding fruition in the arrival of a single, multimedia journalist, and the evolution of a new form of journalism around the world known as convergence, or multiplatform publishing.

What is convergence? It is a form of journalism where newsrooms (often from rival companies) work together to deliver news in a variety of formats. They aim to reach a range of audiences with interactive content on a 24/7 basis. In some cases, one editorial staff produces multiple types of journalism for multiple platforms. The nature of convergence varies
from country to country and from culture to culture, both within countries and within companies. But it is happening. In 2001, Earl Wilkinson, executive director of the International Newspaper Marketing Association, noted that most major publishers worldwide had “accepted the multimedia, brand-oriented future for newspapers.” That year the Innovation International media consulting group estimated that perhaps 100 companies worldwide had embraced the concept. Four years later Ifra, the media research company, estimated that 560 publishers around the world had a “declared and major emphasis” on gathering and delivering news in a variety of platforms and anticipated the number would rise.

The multimedia journalist is also an increasing trend around the Western world. As of early 2005, they tended to be in the minority in most newsrooms, but that will change as candidates graduate from journalism programs. At the pioneering News Center in Tampa, Florida, six of the just over 400 editorial staff at the Tampa Tribune, WFLA-TV and tbo.com are true multimedia reporters. Prestigious internships there go to students who are aware of the potential of multimedia reporting. The single journalist who can write, shoot, edit, and package multimedia content will become increasingly valuable, especially in situations where it is not possible to get a group of journalists into an area such as wars or isolated regions, or in small markets. With time, these reporters will attract a premium in terms of salary and recognition.

Photojournalists tend to be early adopters and represent examples of what is possible. In Austria, for example, photojournalists at the Vorarlberger Nachrichten in Schwarzhach have carried camera-enabled cell phones as well as standard digital cameras since 2002. On arrival at a news event, they were all expected to take photographs with the cell phone and immediately send images to the newspaper’s Web site before using their other cameras. Jochen Hofer, editor-in-chief of Vorarlberger Online, said the policy started in July 2002 after a photographer found he could not send images taken with his digital camera via the local phone lines because the files were too large and the connection poor. “That’s why we tried our MMS [multimedia messaging system] mobiles. We knew we had to win time,” Hofer said. Photojournalists sent MMS images to online editors via the cell phone and then telephoned the newsroom to dictate two or three sentences about what happened. Hofer said his photojournalists used MMS for most news events such as accidents, fires, and avalanches, plus sporting events. “The photographers get a new mobile every year, so the quality of the pictures sent by MMS is improving steadily” (quoted in Northrup, 2004, p. 18).
The war in Iraq that started in March 2003 was a watershed in terms of journalists’ use of technology. The biggest changes involved a major reduction in the size and weight of the equipment, and considerable improvements in the speed of delivery.

During the Gulf war of 1991, the available satellite newsgathering technology weighed more than a ton, was packed into perhaps a dozen boxes, and took a team two hours to unpack. Jump forward just over a decade to the invasion of Iraq and journalists’ satellite newsgathering gear weighed about 45 kilograms — about 100 pounds — and two people could set it up in less than half an hour. Everything could fit into two suitcases rather than a dozen. The units combined MPEG-2 encoders, miniature antennae and a multiplexer. The last is a device that combines several inputs into one signal so it can be transported via a single transmission channel. The system employed lower-power amplifiers and smaller dishes than previous packages. The mobile, very small aperture terminal (MVSAT) fold-up antenna — a mere 1.2 meters (48 inches) in diameter — could handle voice, video and data at the same time at speeds of up to 3.8 megabits a second. Alternatively, a solo multimedia or backpack journalist with a camera, laptop, digital camera, satellite phone and accessories often carried less than 40 kilos — about 90 pounds — even when their kit included a chemical suit, gas mask and other safety gear. Many correspondents typically connected their digital video camcorders to Macintosh G4 laptops. They used Apple’s Final Cut Pro to edit video, and then transmitted their packages via satellite phones.

It’s useful here to briefly consider the lessons of history. New technologies have always had an impact on newsgathering. Media historian Anthony Smith noted that the telegraph had a “substantial” impact on the English provincial press from the middle of the 19th century, because it allowed them to “hold their own against metropolitan newspapers” (Smith, 1978, p. 209). In the early part of the 20th century, the telephone changed the structure of American journalism, producing “legmen” who collected news and phoned it in, and “re-write men” in the office who tailored the news to fit the personality of the newspaper. The telephone switchboard later transformed the nature of reporting in the 1920s and 1930s (Smith, 1979, p. 150), just as the computer changed
newsgathering from about the 1980s through the development of computer-assisted reporting.

Dr. Mark Deuze, a visiting professor at Indiana University journalism school, noted that war and technological developments had always complemented each other. “Their respective impact on the acceleration of certain trends and technology-related developments in journalism is important,” he said.

This situation had important cultural implications. It was reflected in the style of involved reporting in World War II of people like Ernie Pyle, which in turn could be related to the New Journalism movement in the United States decades later, Deuze said. In the first Iraq War in 1991, the U.S. networks’ use of satellite broadcasting technologies triggered the popularity of 24/7 live television. The invasion of Iraq propelled Webloggers — both professional and amateur — to center stage (Deuze, 2005).

Nigel Dacre, the editor of London’s Independent Television News, noted that a new technology seemed to emerge in every recent war or conflict. Videophones had “really come into their own during the Afghanistan campaign,” he said. CNN reporter Nic Robertson was one of the first reporters to experiment with the videophone. He broadcast video of a hijacking in Kandahar, Afghanistan, in 1999. The BBC first used one in the spring of 2000, when correspondent James Reynolds reported from Santiago, Chile, on the lead-up to the arrest of General Augusto Pinochet. John Simpson used a videophone in Afghanistan on the night the United States started its bombing campaign. Sky News correspondent Geoff Meade also sent pictures from near Kabul that same night. In January 2001, Nic Robertson reported from the scene of the Bhuj earthquake in India in a fraction of the time it would have taken with conventional equipment. And on April 12 that year, CNN showed live the U.S. Air Force lifting its people from Hainan Island, off the Chinese mainland, after a collision with a Chinese F-8 fighter had forced their plane to land 11 days earlier. Videophones also played an important role in CNN’s coverage of the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon on September 11, 2001. Reporters also used them to interview rescue workers and survivors from the scene at Ground Zero.

The big difference with new technology in the early 21st century compared with a generation earlier was speed, ITN’s Nigel Dacre said. During the Vietnam conflict, for example, it would have taken at least 24 hours to get the Hainan Island footage to air. With the videophone, it was almost instantaneous. The nature of the conflict in Afghanistan and Iraq made reporting difficult and expensive, Dacre said, but even more so.
without the new technologies. Afghanistan was the first main story that ITN had covered using videophones. John Beeston, news director for CNN Online in Hong Kong, said the development of small and inexpensive digital equipment such as cameras had enormous implications for the way in which journalists worked.

A traditional camera crew in its four-wheel drive with many boxes of gear is pretty obvious. People know they are a television crew. When a camera is pointed at people, it changes the dynamics of the situation. People behave differently. A single video-journalist is less intimidating. Film crews are all about deadlines. A single video-journalist can produce material for a variety of formats: television, real audio or video on the Web, [even] stills. It changes the dynamics of the reporting process and it changes the deadline from the next news bulletin to any time (Beeston, 2001).

**The Primacy of Images**

It is a truism that television needs graphic pictures. Otherwise it becomes radio with wallpaper pictures.

Until the invasion of Iraq, news desks would tolerate poor quality or grainy images from videophones if they showed live or important news. Grainy images gave a mood of reality. Newspapers similarly published poor-quality photographs if the image had sufficient news value (such as the explosion of the Challenger shuttle in January 1986). All that changed with the war in Iraq. Ian Ritchie, chief executive officer of Associated Press Television News (APTN), said his broadcast clients expected to see quality images immediately the fighting began in Iraq. “With this one you need to be live or very close to live … our biggest investment before the conflict was in insuring live coverage.” APTN set up 40 operational cameras in Iraq and neighboring countries in the months prior to the fighting. Many of the cameras on the road had a “store and forward” capability. This meant that images could be transferred from camera to laptop, and from there to a satellite telephone or to a satellite news gathering facility. “We were the first with live pictures out of Um Qasr in the beginning of the war and we were the first with live pictures from Baghdad airport [after it was captured],” Ritchie said (Schleifer, 2003).

Former BBC correspondent David Cass, who presented news for the English-language news programs of Al-Arabiya in Dubai, said image quality was one of the key issues during the Iraq War:
In this environment, quality is the single most important factor. In just the same way as the news organizations want to upgrade their signals sent by correspondents in the field, from the jumpy, grainy sat-phone quality that came to prominence in Afghanistan, to full-on broadcast quality, so the viewer sitting at home needs at least the quality in light entertainment, sports, and movies to which he has become accustomed.

Cass noted that a Russian TV network, RTVI, had pioneered sending quality images between New York and Moscow using Internet protocol television (IPTV). Path 1 Network Technologies, a San Diego, California, company, developed the software. This technology saves money by removing satellite costs, which Cass said were “crippling” the big news organizations. RTVI was able to send four to six megabits of live video

**VIDEOPHONES JOIN THE FRAY**

After CNN used a videophone on Hainan island in April 2001, manufacturer 7E Communications said they had difficulty filling orders from broadcasters around the world. In November 2001, the company won the prestigious *Wall Street Journal* Business Innovation Award for the phone.

“We are selling them as fast as we can make them to news organizations around the world,” said company spokesman Peter Beardow at the time.

A UK company, 7E Communications is based near Heathrow airport. Their technology enables journalists to file reports that would have been impossible with traditional satellite equipment.

The 7E phone employs the H.263 compression algorithm and can either use one channel of ISDN to operate at 64 kilobits a second or by combining both ISDN channels can send at 128 kilobits a second. It also has built-in audio mixing capabilities.

A videophone can send images at up to 20 frames a second. These phones are based on video-conferencing technology and cost $8,000-10,000. A videophone is about the size of a laptop, weighs about 10 kilos (22 pounds), and a single person can operate it. Phone line costs are about a tenth of the cost of traditional satellite transmission.

Though battery operated, they can also be used with other power sources.

CNN reporter Nic Robertson is said to have once powered one using his car battery via its cigarette lighter.
from New York to Moscow. Image quality was excellent despite the poor Russian telecoms infrastructure. The potential return on capital investment of this technology was almost immediate, Cass said.

Most news organizations managed to produce excellent images from the heat of battle in Iraq. The late NBC correspondent David Bloom broadcast from on top of a tank recovery vehicle with the Third Infantry, while technician Craig White controlled the camera from inside the vehicle. White sent full bandwidth video and audio via microwaves to a satellite-equipped truck two miles behind the advancing military. From that vehicle, full bandwidth video was sent to the network. Stacy Brady, vice president of field operations for NBC News, described the pictures as “fabulous” (quoted in Johnston, 2003).

**The Power of the Laptop**

In November 2003, BBC journalists became the first in the world to employ innovative software to broadcast video news live via laptop computers. Laptop newsgathering (LNG) requires a digital video camera, a laptop, and some proprietary software called Quicklink. Loaded onto Panasonic Toughbook laptops and used in conjunction with Avid editing software, the software compressed broadcast quality video into a file that could be transmitted as an e-mail attachment. The compression algorithm enabled one minute of quality television to be transmitted in somewhere between 90 seconds and two minutes. This was a vast improvement on the grainy images of the videophone. It took a videophone about 20 minutes to transit a one-minute report and the quality was not as good. The software needs a high-speed Internet connection such as an ISDN line or wireless connection, using IPTV.

Peter Mayne, executive editor of BBC newsgathering, said the BBC had provided Quicklink to all its reporters around the world. “The system was used extensively during the Iraq War by our news teams who were in the most forward positions. Being in the thick of the action [they] needed to travel with the smallest and lightest equipment possible.” Mayne said the BBC could easily update the software to its correspondents. It was scalable depending on the available Internet connection, and could operate from about 64 kilobits a second through to one megabit a second. “The greater the bandwidth, the better the picture quality,” Mayne said. Ken Herron, director of Quicklink, said several other broadcasters were experimenting with the software. Videophone connections could only transmit live video at a maximum speed of 128 kilobits a second, Herron
said, while Quicklink software allowed feeds of up to one megabit a second depending on the speed of the connection (Quicklink press release 2004).

Editorial managers are always balancing the key equations of time versus money and flexibility versus cost. Delivery over the Internet, if available, is cheap but limited in terms of flexibility because it is fixed in place. Satellite phones allow for greater mobility, but the costs are much higher than an Internet connection because bandwidth is limited and the cost-per-minute charges are higher. Combined with laptop computer newsgathering (LNG), satellite phones give journalists considerable independence. BBC’s Peter Mayne said correspondents had tested LNG in West Africa before the Iraq invasion and were satisfied the system was rugged enough to cope with battlefield situations. “LNG software integrates well with our editing platform on one laptop [which is] a distinct advantage for teams that need to travel light,” Mayne said. The U.S. television network, ABC News, also used LNG in the Gulf.

Conventional satellite hardware costs much more than LNG hardware. Satellite uplink technology costs at least $100,000. These transponders typically send real time video at about three megabits a second. Satellite phones are cheaper. A videophone costs about $8,000 for a single delivery channel of 64 kilobits a second, or $10,000 for two kilobit-a-second channels. Any video transmitted live by videophone will be of poor resolution because of the low frame rate compared with broadcast-quality video. A LNG laptop with Quicklink software costs about $4,000. Michael Murrie, professor of broadcast journalism at Pepperdine University in California, said that for the price of one satellite newsgathering (SNG) unit, a news organization could deploy several reporters each with a laptop, digital camcorder, and satellite phone. A SNG unit would usually need at least a technician and a reporter, Murrie said.

With less bulky equipment, the laptop newsgatherers are more mobile. These crews can go to more remote locations. Transmission costs may be higher, but they can operate more efficiently as one-person crews saving personnel costs (Murrie, 2003).

**Consequences for Newsgathering**

Because of the availability of relatively cheap digital equipment, the BBC has been experimenting with the concept of the single reporter able to shoot, write, edit, and package an entire news story for domestic news
programs. This person is known as a video-journalist, or VJ.

The VJ was the brainchild of Michael Rosenblum, a former CBS news producer turned media consultant. Rosenblum developed this idea at NY1 in Manhattan and convinced the BBC that it could boost newsgathering efficiency by using the latest digital technology. Rosenblum said the scheme was an attempt to “build television along the lines of a newspaper” operation. “We want to take them [journalists] out of the newsroom and put them in the field where they can gather news,” he said. Rosenblum said his process would cut the cost of production by 20-70 percent and the BBC contracted him to train about 600 BBC staff. Groups of journalists and other staff such as cameramen and production assistants volunteered to attend three-week training courses.

The process became known as personal digital production (PDP), and the BBC established a training center in Newcastle in the north of England. Paul Myles, the PDP center coordinator, said all VJs used a firewire cable to transfer footage from a camera to a laptop or desktop computer. A firewire cable links a camera and computer, and transfers data rapidly from one to the other. Trainees at the Newcastle center learned nonlinear editing during their three-week course. Myles said most video editing was done with Avid DV Express 3.5.4 when trainees returned to their newsrooms, but they had to learn about other software because a handful of newsrooms used Final Cut Pro and Liquid Edition. Video journalists were initially given a Sony PD150 digital video camera. After 2004, course attendees received a later model, the PD170.

It’s a lightweight camera that has two channels of audio. We make several alterations to the basic camera. We have replaced the onboard Sony domestic microphone with a Sennheisser 416 microphone. It’s a sensitive and directional microphone that helps us acquire excellent actuality. (Myles, 2004)

Myles’s team also added a wide-angle lens and lens hood.

This allows us to get closer to the subjects we are filming, providing the benefits of a steadier shot, better depth of field, clearer audio and greater intimacy with character. (Myles, 2004)

Myles said video-journalists mainly contributed to the BBC regional evening news programs, but they also contributed to current affairs, political, Welsh language, and children’s programs.
The range of stories and techniques are almost as numerous as the trainees themselves. Many find the access and the ability to tell stories through real people’s eyes the big attraction. For the others, multiple deployments are a big draw offering the ability to show several dimensions of a story simultaneously (Myles, 2004).

Myles said the flexibility offered by the nonlinear editing systems helped producers create “very individual styles.” Video journalists were not intended to replace television news crews, but to supplement traditional ways of working and to offer more “up-close-and-personal” stories.

It is inevitable that the use of “self operating” staff will reduce the use of traditional crews but this wasn’t the reason for doing it. The big attraction was that this way of working would give greater access, more freedom and creativity to the video-journalist, and a more honest and interesting final product (Myles, 2004).

Newspapers are also embracing the concept of the single multimedia reporter. Regina McCombs is a multimedia reporter and producer for startribune.com, the online division of the Star Tribune in Minneapolis, Minn. She spent 13 years as a television photographer and producer at the award-winning KARE-TV in Minneapolis before joining the newspaper. McCombs said multimedia gave journalists the chance to produce stories in whatever form was most understandable and enjoyable for audiences.

We say this story would be best served with a graphic and a short video, or this would be great with text and audio, or whatever. (McCombs, 2004)

Each year Ifra, the international association for media publishing, publishes the NewsGear, a suite of tools designed for the multimedia journalist. It was a project of the Advanced Journalist Technology Project, an initiative of Ifra’s Center for Advanced News Operations. Kerry Northrup, the center’s executive director, said Ifra had been studying the technological needs of media organizations since 1998, when it assembled the first NewsGear. Northrup said several of Ifra’s members asked for recommendations on the best equipment that would let their reporters become more mobile. Northrup’s team began evaluating hundreds of technologies for their usefulness in a networked, converged newsroom. They brought together the best laptop, digital camera, digital camcorder
and mobile networking device.

“After a while,” Northrup said, “it dawned on us that we were essentially creating a backpack toolkit for journalists.” It was vital that all the pieces worked together “without having to make a reporter carry around a ton of cords and power bricks.” His team had focused on getting all components into a manageable size that a correspondent could work with in a car or take on an aircraft (quoted in Lasica, 2002).

Chris Cramer, former president of CNN International, predicted that the future of television journalism would involve multi-skilling, smaller bureaus, lightweight editing equipment and small cameras, videophones, and satellite telephones. “We have a new array of firepower at our disposal,” he told the NewsXchange conference in Budapest in November 2003. “Covering the world shouldn’t just be for the big boys and girls to handle,” he said. “All of us need to change the way we think. Change the way we practice our craft. And we need to keep changing all the time.” He cited the example of CNN correspondent Nic Robertson’s exclusive when he acquired Osama Bin laden’s personal video collection in August 2002. Robertson’s success came about because he was multi-skilled, Cramer said.

If Nic couldn’t shoot, edit, engineer, and report he couldn’t possibly have picked up and smuggled that remarkable piece of TV journalism out of Afghanistan. And he is just one example of the new breed of broadcaster (Cramer, 2004).

The availability of sophisticated equipment such as the satellite phone and LNG has the potential to produce changes in management policies. With major breaking news, it must be tempting to fly a big name reporter to a country, rather than having people on the ground all the time who know the region and its history. The latter are always going to be more expensive. Nadia Bilbasey, Africa correspondent for the Middle East Broadcasting Center, objects to the concept of flying international correspondents to hot spots, which critics have called, “parachute journalism.”

You have to have specific knowledge about the region you’re covering. American networks have maybe two people to cover the entire continent of Africa. And when something happens they fly in someone who doesn’t know the area and has to rely on the entourage of people around them and simply appear in front of the camera. (Hachten, 1999, p.132)
Khalid Kazziha, senior producer for East/Central and West Africa for Associated Press Television, believes the real threat facing news agencies and media organizations comes from local stringers armed with digital cameras and laptop computers and the ability, as technology advances, to send images over the Internet.

It will revolutionize the way people watch the news. Perhaps it will mean the news will come faster, and maybe it’ll be told in a better way because it’ll be coming from someone at the location. Our region is really big. If our stringer in Congo or Rwanda has the ability to send pictures, we’re not going to be traveling anymore. So I’m then the stranger, I don’t have to be there to tell their story anymore. More and more, people in each location can tell their own stories. (TBS, 2001)

Murrie agreed. He suggested that over time, because digital newsgathering equipment was relatively cheap and common, an increasing number of freelance materials from more diverse locations could appear on news programs. “If cell phone operators begin contributing video, the news gathering process will open dramatically.” Technicians at the BBC have conducted experiments using Nokia digital cellular phones to deliver video from the field. A typical phone can store about two minutes of audio and video. At 15 frames per second (the highest resolution) it takes about 40 minutes to transfer two minutes of video. Murrie does not believe that low-cost digital video from journalists armed with laptops and cell phones will replace heavyweight satellite newsgathering equipment for live coverage “in the near future.” Satellites would still be needed for high quality images and for producing complex news programs on location—the kind of images that people had become accustomed to seeing.

Laptops and even cell phones are just additional tools that can be used to gather more diverse stories, more quickly from a broader range of sites. (Murrie, 2004)

Against this milieu, it may be significant that in March 2005 the BBC announced it would cut 3,230 jobs in an attempt to trim $664 million from the budget. This included 420 journalists. The job losses involved redundancies and plans for more extensive use of freelance rather than full-time positions.

Inexpensive tools that can be purchased off the shelf increase the potential for flexibility, an attractive option during wars. In the first weeks
of the war in Iraq, harsh conditions such as sand storms ruined many journalists’ equipment. “Iraq is tech hell,” CNN’s Kevin Sites wrote in his Weblog a few days before the war started (quoted in Johnston, 2003). David Schleifer, a senior executive with Avid, maker of video-editing software, said journalists on the Inside Edition program found one of their laptops had failed.

They literally had sand stuck in one of the cards and couldn’t make it work. They went to a local computer store in Kuwait and picked up a firewire card, and they were [soon] up and running. (quoted in Johnston, 2003)

Developments in technology make the military nervous. Theoretically, censorship is no longer possible if television reporters can carry their means of transmission with them. During World War II, military censors reviewed reporters’ dispatches before those reports were released. And during the 1991 Gulf War, the 1,400 reporters based in Saudi Arabia got much of their news at daily briefings that the military ran. That conflict was widely seen as the place where reporters had the least opportunity to see first-hand what was going on. It prompted legendary CBS News anchor Walter Cronkite to comment in a PBS documentary:

We have no independent film of the Persian Gulf War, none. Correspondents should be with the troops, everywhere where the troops are. But our film crews were not permitted to go out on the front. They should have been. Then their tape should’ve been sent back to censorship; if it couldn’t be released immediately, at least it would be held for eventual release and history. We don’t have that history now. That history is lost to us. (Pollak & Ives, 2003)

Imagine what an independent reporter armed with a videophone, laptop and satellite phone could do in future conflicts? We may be seeing only the start of a newsgathering revolution.

References
Discussion Questions

1. New technologies have always changed the way reporters have filed stories from the field. The telegraph, for example, resulted in development of the inverted pyramid and summary news lead (the classic Five Ws and H — “who,” “what,” “where,” “when,” “how” and sometimes “why”). Now reporters must be aware of the images as well as narratives they show to tell the story. In what ways has this affected the types of stories they cover?

2. Convergence might have more to do with altering a journalist’s concept of how he or she will fashion their news reports. In what ways do journalists have to ensure the accuracy of their field reporting since they are also reporting in “real time?”

3. While this chapter deals with technology driving war news reporting, what
other considerations should media decision makers make regarded the preparedness of their field reporters. Should their multi-tasking, multimedia skills give them preference over experience and knowledge of local cultures they cover?

4. Why do these new technologies make military planners uneasy as they develop ways of satisfying the often-divergent needs for military operational secrecy and journalists’ needs to report fully and fairly from areas in conflict?

5. Knowing that technological advances will continue at a breath-taking rate in the future as digital convergence becomes the norm, how should journalism curricula adapt to these new ways of covering war and other societal upheavals?
Chapter Two

How International Newspapers Framed the Pre-Iraq War Debate

Atsushi Tajima, Eric Bain, Tao Lam Fung, Andrea Falkenhagen and Chelsea Ross

On March 22, 2003, The New York Times examined claims that the news media failed to challenge the Bush administration aggressively enough as it made its case for war. The article said reporters did not adequately scrutinize the alleged link between Iraq and Al-Qaeda. The Times cited a Knight Ridder poll taken in early January 2003 that showed half of the Americans polled believed at least some of the 9/11 hijackers were Iraqis. None was (Rutenburg & Toner, 2003, March 22, p. D10). One might argue that American media had been framed to speak for their own government, neglecting to include diverse perspectives from other governments, positions and organizations.

As the lone superpower after the Cold War, the United States is the most powerful nation in international politics in various ways. In addition to its diplomatic presence, it possesses the largest military force that can rapidly deploy anywhere in the world. The extensive “attempt to affect what happens beyond its border” (Chanley, 1999, p.23) is what makes U.S. foreign policy powerful and influential. This influence has become crucial in the post-9/11 world, including the overthrow of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan and the Ba’ath regime in Iraq.

According to The Times’ article,

experts say the news media’s role was particularly important this time because Congress offered such a muted challenge until the final weeks of the buildup to war ... the burden fell more heavily on the news media to examine and analyze the administration’s rationale for war. (Rutenburg & Toner, 2003, p. D10)

Due to the extensive role the media have in influencing public opinion,
especially in foreign policy, and the enormous global importance of the conflict with Iraq, careful comparative analysis of such media coverage is crucial to clarify what is or what is not covered as well as how the coverage constructed. With this understanding, does the public have access to the kind of information needed to make informed opinions? Are hidden biases in the news causing misperceptions of the world situation? Do the news media “frame” issues in certain ways, and how?

To explore these questions, this study employs the theoretical framework of “framing.” We first briefly review the concept and its effects, and later provide two empirical analyses to demonstrate how different frames are constructed. Finally, we discuss the implications of our findings on media practice and public opinion.

Framing refers to the journalistic practice of highlighting certain aspects of an issue and excluding others. More broadly, Nelson, et al. (1997) define framing as “the process by which a communication source, such as a news organization, defines and constructs a political issue or public controversy” (p. 567). For example, certain social moods were created through “framed” media discourse of Iraqi President Saddam Hussein during the run-up to the 2003 Iraqi War. Conners (1998) noted that “describing Iraqi president Saddam Hussein as evil, menacing, or mad, could rally support for U.S. involvement and sway public opinion in the direction of the U.S. government’s position” (p. 96). Conners then argued that such framing could create a “psychological need” that could result in a “variety of beneficial outcomes on people, including stress reduction, emotional release, and reduction of inner conflict by projecting negative qualities onto an external source” (p. 97).

To negatively portray, frame and ultimately delegitimize Hussein, some linguistic elements were employed in media coverage. Hussein was often equated with Adolf Hitler during the previous Gulf war (Iyengar & Simon, 1993, pp. 381-382; Seaver, 1998, p 81). The “Hitler analogy” labeled Hussein as a powerful and dangerous dictator. The term “Hitler,” though a mere proper noun, functions as a “value word” (Nelson, Clawson & Oxley, 1997; Brewer, 2002). Dorman and Livingston (1993) found that between Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait (Aug. 2, 1990) and just before the war began (Jan. 15, 1991), The Washington Post and The New York Times published a total of 228 articles that used the Hussein-Hitler analogy. A Times editorial read, “President Bush may or may not be right that Saddam Hussein is worse than Hitler” (Digiacomo, 1990, p. Section 4, 16).

Even simpler, one might keenly recall that news stories often addressed Mr. Hussein without official title but only by his first name,
“Saddam,” while the same stories constantly addressed other political leaders like “President George W. Bush,” “Mr. Bush,” and “Prime Minister Tony Blair.” This is a very unusual media practice since Hussein was still the legitimate head of a state. It is absolutely unthinkable to address President Bush as “George” in the press. Simple linguistics, such as the omission of an official title and the use of a first name, powerfully delegitimize Hussein as a political leader but, simultaneously, stress him as “a dictatorial human agency.”

Apart from linguistic elements, sources being quoted have been acknowledged as an important element of framing. Coverage of foreign-policy issue especially tends to rely on governmental sources, which can control information. Page and Shapiro (1989) note that “on foreign policy matters government officials often control access to information and can conceal or misrepresent the truth with little immediate danger of being challenged. ... With regard to domestic policy, sources of information are usually more diverse” (pp. 310, 313). Particularly, warfare and national security are areas where journalist’s sources can be limited to governmental, often top-down, sources. How they are presented and quoted to frame news stories provides for important analytical consideration.

**Methods: Two Analyses**

This study consists of two analyses. The first is a quantitative coding of frames over a three-month period. The second is an in-depth textual analysis.

For the first coding analysis, we featured 14 different papers from 10 different nations around the world and coded a total of 523 articles from Oct. 10, 2002, through Jan. 15, 2003 (see Table 2.1). Our period of analysis was intended to coincide with the international debate following U.S. President Bush’s threat of taking unilateral military action against Iraq in September 2002. This study limited coding to the front pages, including jumps. Regardless of different journalistic cultures around the world, all news organizations typically place the most important articles on the front page, which is a feasible way to compare different papers of different national origins.

In our coding scheme, frames were determined to be biased as “supporting war,” “opposing war,” “balanced (both ‘supporting’ and ‘opposing’ views were quantitatively and qualitatively equally politically weighted information). This categorization seems relatively simple.
However, the most fundamental debate throughout the period we analyzed was essentially trichotomous: whether the international society should terminate the UN inspections and go to war (supporting war), whether it should allow more time for the inspections instead of going to war (opposing war), or other (included for coverage that did not present either side and showing both sides). Our primary interest follows this important trichotomy. Taking into consideration the numerous studies conducted through and on framing, certain guidelines and methods were agreed upon before determining the type and value of the frames for the articles coded. With this taken into account, a uniform procedure was employed to determine the frames for all articles, as 15 coders undertook this task. Given the idea that sources being quoted are one of the fundamental factors to constitute frame (e.g., Entman, 1991), we also coded a total of

### Table 2.1 Newpaper Sample and Framing Distribution

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of Newspaper Analyzed 10/10/02 to 1/15/03</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Support war</th>
<th>Oppose war</th>
<th>Balanced coverage</th>
<th>Other</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Asahi Shinbun</td>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Financial Times</td>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung</td>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guardian</td>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>La Nacion</td>
<td>Argentine</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Le Monde</td>
<td>France</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Los Angeles Times</td>
<td>United States</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New York Times</td>
<td>United States</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peninsula News</td>
<td>Quarter</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Straits Times</td>
<td>Singapore</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Cybermedia Go to War 58
3,045 sources (See Tables 4.2 and 4.4).

Assuming there are many models for frames, types of frames can be distinguished as either issue-specific news frames or generic news frames. “Issue-specific frames pertain to specific topics or news events, whereas generic frames are broadly applicable to a range of different news topics, some even over time, and potentially, in different cultural contexts” (de Vreese, et al., 2001). As this study focused on the particular topic of the conflict and eventual war with Iraq, the research was restricted to coverage containing issue-specific frames.

For the in-depth textual analysis, we featured a single event: Chief UN Weapons Inspector Hans Blix’s Jan. 27, 2003, presentation to the UN Security Council — a crucial event and turning point of the disarmament discussion. Examining world media coverage of this event provided for fruitful scrutiny since it was an action of no particular country and independent of nationalistic forces. As an impartial public figure, Blix presumably was immune from the biases national newspapers often display towards particular friends or enemies. The frames constructed by each national newspaper should provide insight into how Blix and his claims were framed by the media. For example, it is reasonable to expect that each paper representing a nation reflected the stance, reactions and opinions of its own government. By seeing Blix as a non-national figure, analysis of such discursive interaction should provide us with richer insights about specific frames.

For this textual analysis, we chose articles, dated Jan. 27 and 28, 2003, from nine newspapers in four countries: the United States, United Kingdom, France and Germany. Not only were they the most crucial nations leading the Iraq debate, but they have shown a bipolar contrast in their political stances: the United States and the U.K. were proponents of war, while France and Germany opposed it.

**Findings: Distribution of Frames**

Table 2.2 presents overall numerical findings of how the 523 front-page articles were framed.

If we dichotomize from the U.S./U.K., the two leading nations in support of war, and other regions, we see that newspapers from the former show more support for war, while the newspapers from the latter more frequently opposed war. A chi-square test clearly indicates that the difference between the two groups supporting and the nations opposing war is statistically significant. \( p < .000001, \ df = 2 \).
Since the literature has suggested that news sources and the ways they are quoted contribute to framing, we also coded types of quoted news sources and the frequencies of sources being quoted. The simplified summary is shown in Table 2.3.

Needless to say, each paper presented its own nation’s governmental sources frequently. The U.S. papers featured 45% of their quotations from U.S. governmental sources, while the U.K. papers devoted less than half as many (20%) of their quotations to U.K. official sources.

A few additional quantitative figures were noteworthy. Papers from “other regions,” devoted about 15% of their quotations to Iraqi governmental sources. It is important to note that this analysis did not feature any Iraqi papers. This phenomenon cannot be attributed to the notion of “quoting one’s own governmental sources,” as discussed through the U.S. and U.K. cases. This is a relatively high frequency.

### Table 2.2

**Dominant Frames**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Supporting War</th>
<th>Opposing War</th>
<th>Balanced</th>
<th>Other</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>U.S. (n)</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>191</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>%</td>
<td>34.55</td>
<td>15.71</td>
<td>24.08</td>
<td>25.61</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.K. (n)</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>%</td>
<td>51.61</td>
<td>17.20</td>
<td>29.03</td>
<td>2.15</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S./U.K. Total (n)</td>
<td>112</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>284</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>%</td>
<td>39.43</td>
<td>16.20</td>
<td>25.70</td>
<td>17.96</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-U.S./U.K. Combined (n)</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>239</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>%</td>
<td>12.55</td>
<td>4.609</td>
<td>14.22</td>
<td>27.19</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>French/German* (n)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>46</td>
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<tr>
<td>(%</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>5.000</td>
<td>2.91</td>
<td>2.69</td>
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<tr>
<td>All Regions Total (n)</td>
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<td>156</td>
<td>107</td>
<td>116</td>
<td>523</td>
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<tr>
<td>%</td>
<td>27.35</td>
<td>29.82</td>
<td>20.49</td>
<td>22.17</td>
<td>100</td>
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*French/German papers are included in “Non-U.S./U.K..”*
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<td>U.S. government</td>
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<td>43 28.29</td>
<td>208 25.09</td>
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<td>U.S. non-</td>
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<td>26 6.67</td>
<td>4 2.63</td>
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<td>government</td>
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<tr>
<td>Iraqi government</td>
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<td>41 10.51</td>
<td>8 5.26</td>
<td>124 14.96</td>
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<tr>
<td>Iraqi Non-</td>
<td>83 4.98</td>
<td>18 4.62</td>
<td>2 1.32</td>
<td>28 3.38</td>
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<tr>
<td>U.K. government</td>
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<td>78 20.00</td>
<td>8 5.26</td>
<td>29 3.50</td>
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<tr>
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<td>9 2.31</td>
<td>32 21.05</td>
<td>35 4.22</td>
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<td>government</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia/Chinese</td>
<td>22 1.32</td>
<td>8 2.05</td>
<td>5 3.29</td>
<td>28 3.38</td>
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<td>government</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other governments</td>
<td>106 6.37</td>
<td>42 10.77</td>
<td>9 5.92</td>
<td>116 13.99</td>
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<td>United Nations</td>
<td>193 11.59</td>
<td>34 8.72</td>
<td>23 15.13</td>
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<td>Other sources</td>
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<td>65 16.67</td>
<td>18 11.84</td>
<td>110 13.27</td>
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<tr>
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<td>1665 100</td>
<td>390 100</td>
<td>152 100</td>
<td>829 100</td>
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Incidentally, they featured “other governmental sources,” which included their own governmental sources, only 14% of the time. The high proportion of “opposing war” frames among those papers may be attributed to their focus on Iraqi sources when compared with U.S. and U.K. papers.

Furthermore, newspapers from all regions relied on U.S. sources on the Iraq issue, although their degrees varied. For example, German and French papers featured U.S. governmental sources 28% of the time, while they featured their “own governmental sources” 21% of the time, which
theoretically should have distinctively opposing viewpoints from U.S. and U.K. sources. Interestingly, while the pro-war papers quoted each other’s government sources, they hardly featured their opponents: France and Germany. The U.S. papers showed that 47% of their quotations were from the U.S. and the U.K. governments, while only 2.1% of their quotations were from the two most vocal opponents of war.

A possible explanation for this discrepancy could be that the war debate was primarily led by the United States and, to a lesser degree, the United Kingdom. The idea of going to war became an “official international agenda” when Bush announced that possibility at the UN. Since then, high-level U.S. government sources continuously broached the idea of attacking Iraq. At the same time, the governmental officials of “opposing-war” nations were not actively vocal because they favored retaining UN weapons inspectors. Symbolically, this disproportionate feature of U.S. officials implicitly illustrates the “unilateral” nature of the U.S. policy. In the following textual-analysis section, we attempted to demonstrate how a heavy reliance on certain governmental officials could create certain frames.

**Textual Analysis**

Through a textual analysis, the constructions of frames were dissected to investigate the techniques employed in developing the form and style of particular frames. Fundamentally, frames were determined by various factors that all contribute to the construction of frames: headlines, quoted sources, legitimation or illegitimation of sources, placement and structure of information, and the use of value words. For this particular event, Blix’s UN speech, all of the nine articles were framed “supporting-war” except for a “balanced” *Washington Post* article, a “balanced” *Le Monde* (French newspaper) article, and one “opposing-war” *Sueddeutsche Zeitung* (German newspaper) article.

Intended to grab a reader’s attention, consideration was initially placed on headlines, because they are boldly printed abstracts that succinctly summarize and represent an editor’s view of the story. Headlines introduce and summarize the main content of an article, thus contributing to the overall framing. The headline for the *Financial Times*’ lead story read, “Blix attacks Baghdad over lack of co-operation.” Adjacent to the headline is a quote box that read: “Iraq appears not to have come to a genuine acceptance, not even today, of the disarmament that was demanded of it.” The same quote also appeared in the second paragraph
of the article. Consequently, this article was framed “supporting-war.” The reporters consciously chose to stress Blix’s statement that Iraq had not accepted disarmament and articulate that to mounting U.S. and U.K. impatience. As a case in point, the two upper headlines suggested that Iraqi noncompliance only accelerated any use of force. This framed the article in a way that implied any evidence of Iraqi hostility towards cooperation was a threat to peaceful inspections.

However, not all headlines elaborately contribute to frames. Many are much more direct. In Britain’s Guardian, the headline stated, “Another step towards war.” Despite the fact that this “step” actually involved giving UN inspectors more time, this rather presumptuous headline resonated throughout the rest of the article so as to construct a “supporting-war” frame. On the other hand, the headline in Munich’s Sueddeutsche Zeitung stated, “Schroeder: War only after a second UN-Resolution.” This succinct summation of the German response to Blix’s presentation similarly added to an “opposing-war” frame, which was prevalent throughout the remainder of the article.

Beyond headlines, how sources are quoted in the main text of each article largely influence how frames are determined. A journalist’s treatment of quoted sources can often tip the scale, throwing off the balance of an article, thus creating a frame. Though the ideal of objective journalism supposedly presents the views of diverse quoted sources, affording equal and impartial priority to all angles of the debate, it is not always realized. Nevertheless, a “balanced” frame exists within this context.

As certain figures push specific agendas, who is being quoted can lead to particular frames. For example, heavy reliance on hawkish U.S. official sources contributed to “supporting-war” frames. Additionally, beyond who is being quoted, it is important to consider how sources are quoted. Blix was directly quoted in every article covering his presentation. However, as every article framed “supporting-war” used his quotes speaking of Iraq’s failure to cooperate, Munich’s Sueddeutsche Zeitung framed its article “opposing-war” by quoting Blix as calling for more time for inspections.

Furthermore, the amount of space allotted to each quote, the location of each quote, and how each quote is prioritized and interrelated with other quotes all contribute to frames. In the Washington Post, a “balanced” frame was constructed. Suggesting inspections had failed, the Washington Post reported, “‘It is not enough to open doors,’ [Blix] said, adding that the level of cooperation by Baghdad required by UN resolutions continued to be often ‘withheld or given grudgingly.’” This
was immediately followed by, “In a more positive overall assessment, Mohamed El-Baradei ... said the IAEA [International Atomic Energy Agency] should be able “within the next few months to provide credible assurance that Iraq has no nuclear weapons programs,”” negating the previous “supporting-war” argument by Blix and lending to a “balanced” frame.

However, quotes can also be weighted to contribute to a particular frame. In *The New York Times*, immediately following Blix’s main quote on Iraq’s noncompliance of disarmament, the reporter choose to mention that U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell believed “time is running out,” reinforcing Blix’s report as a trigger for military action, which contributed to a “supporting-war” frame. The *Los Angeles Times*’ article, “Damning Portrait of Arms Programs” is framed “supporting-war” for its failure to equally present arguments opposing war. The article contained only one quote by El-Baradei that supported more inspections, as opposed to four quotes from inspectors, as well as seven Blix quotes that spoke of Iraq as a threat. Whereas Blix’s “supporting-war” opinions were backed up with facts from his report, IAEA Director General Mohamed El-Baradei’s “opposing-war” quote was not backed up with any facts thereafter, but left dangling at the end of the article.

The location of quotes within an article can also affect the frame. *The New York Times* constructed a “supporting-war” frame because of the prioritization of certain quotes. Although many quotes from representatives of UN veto-wielding nations are given, they are relegated to the end of the article. The reporter instead chooses to highlight quotes supporting military action in the beginning, while placing the “peace-seeking” quotes toward the end.

In addition to quoted sources, the construction of frames can be influenced by how journalists treat the organization of information and sources. For example, the “balanced” frame constructed in the *Washington Post* article is achieved by pitting Blix’s statements against nations, such as France, Russia and South Africa, which all supported more time for inspections. In contrast, *The Guardian* constructed a “supporting-war” frame. Here the reporters mentioned Blix had “acknowledged that Baghdad had granted access to weapons inspectors.” However, this is instantly followed by “But he said:” — then trailed by his primary quote. Later, in the fifth and sixth paragraphs, the reporter mentioned that France, China, Russia and El-Baradei were all calling for the “inspectors to be given more time.” Following this quote, the reporter reinforces a “supporting-war” frame by mentioning Blix’s references to Iraq’s possession of chemical and illegal weapons.
Legitimization and de-legitimization are both techniques of organizing information to construct particular frames. It is possible that a slight “supporting-war” frame exists in The Los Angeles Times’ article, “Iraq Seems Unwilling to Give Up Weapons, UN Inspector Says,” because it relied so heavily on “official” sources. Little space is given to balance the article with “opposing-war” arguments. The “supporting-war” frame of the article is strengthened as the reporters de-legitimized the single “opposing-war” voice—an Iraqi official quoted with vague rhetoric, speaking of “warmongers.”

As another example, the “supporting-war” frame of the Guardian’s article left audiences conscious of the debate within British parliament. The reporters chose to counter the Liberal Democrats’ argument of supporting indefinite time for inspections with the Tories’ complaint that ministers “have not argued the case they could do” to persuade voters. The Liberal Democrat’s argument was essentially dismissed as repetitive by the Tories’ fresh critique of waning public support in Britain for military action, ultimately sealing a “supporting-war” frame for the article.

Newspaper reporters also use various linguistic expressions to frame their news stories. Brewer (2002) argues that “frames use ‘value words’ to link a particular position on an issue…to an abstract value” (p. 303). By attaching “value words” to a particular issue, readers are most likely to adopt such perspective as their own (Brewer, 2002). However, blatant strong or harsh “value words” are not always overtly present in many frames. Rather, reporters simultaneously rationally present “vague” words or phrases lending to a particular frame by either justifying one angle or de-legitimating the opposing angle.

The use of “value words” was taken into consideration in coding, and numerous cases illustrate their powerful role. Proponents of regime change, national security and Iraqi liberation frame the issue with the language of support for war, or “supporting war,” arguing the use of “force” is the best means to ensure such. Opponents of war, or those who are “opposing war,” frame the same issue with the language of peace, providing humanitarian justifications and legitimizing increased time for UN inspections. Presenting an equally dichotomous debate, “balanced” frames serve as a detached intermediary lacking any unilateral agenda.

For example, in The Financial Times’ “supporting-war” article, the reporters chose to play on an already fearful audience by mentioning specific examples of Blix’s inspections turning up “mustard gas” and illegal “long-range missile projects.” Similarly, The New York Times reported that Blix had found “indications that Iraq had created weapons using the nerve agent VX, which he described as ‘one of the most toxic...
ever developed.” In turn, these specific references only garnered support for war by painting Iraq’s guilt as a threat to world peace.

**Summary and Discussion**

This analysis revealed that more than half of each newspaper’s coverage of the conflict with Iraq was framed as either “supporting war” or “opposing war.” Specifically, papers from the United States and U.K. were more frequently framed as “supporting war,” while papers from other nations were more often framed as “opposing war.” The sources quoted in each article are pertinent in determining the frame. The U.S. and U.K. papers relied heavily on their own official sources and local reporting, although the action and conflict took place in Iraq.

Our analysis also coded the location of reporting and found that the majority of articles from U.S. and U.K. papers were reported from within the United States or U.K. (62% of the U.S. articles were reported from the United States; 53% of the U.K. articles were reported from U.K.). The textual analysis illustrated how the effects of various elements of framing, such as the role of the headlines, value words, journalists’ selection of salience, and the complex roles of sources being quoted, all function to construct frames.

The data revealed that the Anglo-American newspapers provided more balanced coverage. The U.S./U.K. papers had a total of 26.62% balanced coverage compared with the 14.22% balanced coverage papers from other regions displayed. This could be due to the Anglo-American journalistic tradition that expects newspapers to provide all sides of a story for fair and balanced reporting. However, if we examine the entire framing distribution, over 50% of U.S./U.K. articles were determined as “unbalanced” (i.e., “supporting” [40%] or “opposing” [10%]). In sum, while they provide more balanced coverage, they do not provide balanced frames.

French and German papers are apparently biased as well — 50% of the coded articles contained an anti-war frame. But unlike their U.S. counterparts, these papers do not make much attempt to appear unbiased. They have an agenda, and European readers recognize that fact. Chalaby (1996) credits part of this disparity to the political histories of the different countries and the journalistic traditions that historically developed as a result of them.

In the United Kingdom and the United States, political struggles were generally confined to parliamentary or congressional bipartisanship.
Journalists could claim to be “neutral” simply by proclaiming to be “impartial” by giving an equal amount of attention to each political party. This bimodal view of the political struggle evolved to a high professional value of reporting news and information rather than only political opinion. In France, journalists faced a more complex political landscape as the space of political positions was much wider and the field of political possibilities was more open (p. 319).

However, while U.S. reporters and editors might strive to provide objective accounts of news and factual information, it is unrealistic to believe that they do not have their own opinions or agendas that subtly affect the framing of their work. There are inevitably biases in all reporting — they are perhaps more hidden (e.g., structural linkages between newspapers and the centers of power), if not insidiously covert, than the biases published in papers from other regions with different journalistic traditions.

Similarly, sources quoted in the non-U.S./U.K. papers appeared to be more diverse and well-rounded, although almost a quarter were still coming from U.S. governmental sources. However, we have to remember that it is framing that ultimately conveys the actual weight and meaning of any number of sources and quotes.

It is also imperative to analyze how the sources are presented and interact with each other in the article. For example, not only significantly more U.S. sources were quoted than Iraqi sources, but U.S. sources were also presented differently than Iraqi sources. Iraqi sources were rarely quoted as dominant sources. In some instances, Iraqi sources were quoted as counter-offensive to the U.S. sources (mostly to U.S. policy-making officials). However, the Iraqi sources were typically limited to statements by the country’s very limited high-ranking officials, specifically Foreign Minister Naji Sabri and Iraqi Ambassador to the UN Mohammed Douri, who were readily available in New York. The number of their quotes as well as the space devoted to them, is relatively small—typically one or two lines. For example, while a New York Times article quotes nine American sources describing Iraq’s “maliciousness” in interrupting the weapon inspection, only one Iraqi source is quoted for two lines. And they were only quoted as saying, “We don’t have weapons of mass destruction.” There were no other details. This does not provide any new information or insight to the readers.

Another key example lies in the discussion of Hans Blix’s report on weapon inspections. In a Los Angeles Times article, Blix was quoted giving many “damning” facts of Iraqi weapons violations, and several former weapons inspectors praised Blix’s strong words. However, the
viewpoints supporting further inspections were framed quite differently. Iraqi foreign Minister Naji Sabri was quoted as saying:

We have done everything possible to let this country and this region avoid the danger of war by the warmongers in Washington and their ally British Prime Minister Tony Blair. They are fond of exporting destruction and death to other parts of the world.

No rational or clearly articulated quotes from any Iraqi or another nations’ source in the region was quoted.

We argue that quoting Iraqi sources, however sparingly, might superficially function as journalists’ cross-check practice of “fair and balanced” reporting. The opposing Iraqi sources do not actually provide any substantial information, statements, or opinions. Seemingly, they were quoted to merely fulfill the “both sides” requirement for journalists in the most basic way. Such news stories did not actually present a diverse array of information on which readers could base an opinion. If journalists seriously desired to achieve real “fair and balanced” coverage, they had to treat Iraqi sources the same as the U.S. and UN sources, both quantitatively and qualitatively.

Often reporters superficially present “both sides,” then delegitimate one side with a discrediting analysis or negating quote. For example, in the same Los Angeles Times article, Blix was quoted as saying that Iraq has cooperated “rather well” in providing access to inspection sites. However, within the context of the article, “Iraq has cooperated rather well” is preceded with “although” and directly followed by information stating authorities have blocked flights of U-2 surveillance planes and seem to have intimidated scientists into refusing private interviews. Suggesting incomplete Iraqi compliance, the manner in which this information is constructed delegitimizes Blix’s initial statement recognizing Iraqi cooperation.

Through the delegitimization of such quotes, this framing technique provides a “sentiment” of a non-cooperation by Iraq. The sentence would have had a completely different tone and meaning if it read, “while authorities have blocked some flights and intimidated some scientists to refuse interviews, Blix said that overall Iraq has cooperated, ‘rather well.’” This would change the frame to be much more positive. Instead the reporter chose to pick a positive-sounding quote and sandwich it between two negative word choices.

This research has also led us to speculate on the relationship between the number of sources quoted and the overall balance and objectivity of
the article. It is generally believed that more quotes means less inference and elaboration from the reporter, which could possibly increase the objectivity of the overall article. However, our analysis has found some occasions where presenting more sources and “both sides” does not necessarily show diverse perspectives and “unframe” an article.

Thus, we argue that superficial Anglo-American journalistic norms and practices possess a danger to deceive audiences. By recognizing the presentation of two sides to a story, audiences may assume they are “reading unbiased media text.” They may then believe to be well-informed without bias. This essentially produces less-critical audiences. To further analyze this, as other researchers have suggested, using the current data as an independent variable to explore “audience framing,” could further an understanding about the effects of framing in a larger context.

REFERENCES


**Articles Used for In-depth Textual Analysis**


**Discussion Questions**

1. Content analysis of major newspapers is one way to establish news frames. Are these frames conscious attempts at manipulating reader receptions or unconscious results of writer/editor biases?

2. One of the findings in this study shows that American newspapers generally supported the war in Iraq while European newspapers were against the incursion for a variety of reasons. Why do you think is the main reason for the bifurcation of these editorial positions?

3. The main source for news around the world tended to be U.S. government sources, but Anglo-American newspapers tried to give more balanced coverage than their European counterparts. What, if anything, does this say about biased news coverage, and its impact on public opinion?

4. How do journalists use language to legitimize or delegitimize war supporters and opposition? Give examples of both.

5. Both the governments of France and Germany opposed the 2003 Iraq War.
Who can be said to set the agenda for national policy in those countries on the war issue? The newspapers, the politicians, or the public?
Chapter Three


Shafiqur Rahman and Jyotika Ramprasad

The Internet is a unique medium given its interactivity, its largely free access, its unlimited space and its global audience. Does this uniqueness shape its content in ways that make it different from the content of print newspapers? This study makes an effort to answer the question by comparing content on the Iraq War in three media: The New York Times print version, New York Times online and Yahoo News.

The 2003 Iraq War triggered worldwide attention and interest for various reasons. The modern technologies of communication, including the Internet, were used extensively to disseminate war-related news to a global audience. If the 1991 Iraq War is remembered as a “real time” war presented by CNN, then the 2003 Iraq War will be associated with an increased presence of online and digital media. Online media, with their round-the-clock breaking news and riveting audio-visual battlefield reporting, became a major player in this war’s reporting.

The 2003 Iraq War generated widespread anti-Americanism throughout the world, largely because the United States and its allies waged a preemptive war without United Nations approval. A substantial portion of this anti-American sentiment was vented on the Internet. In fact, new Web sites were created with the sole purpose of attacking the war. Most of these sites were created and maintained not so much by individuals as by different organizations including those representing religious extremists. Web sites of different media organizations, such as Al-Jazeera, also became popular for presenting non-American perspectives on the Iraq War.
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